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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVlD G. pJj;ARSOX and fjJL\'A P. 
PEARSOK, 
P/.aintiffs awl AptJefhmlN, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE ·COUNTY, a municipal 
corporation, BOARD OF COTJN'rY 
CO:J.fMI~SIONERS OF SALT \ Case Xo. 9042 
LAKE COT~NTY and LAMO~TT B. 
GCNDERSEN, EDWIN Q. CA~NON 
and A B l'tA~l BARKER, ~fEMBERR 
OJ<' THE BOARD OF COL'XTY 
COJ\1 :rvtiSSIOXERR OF SAL'f 
LAKJ<: COUNTY. 
Defendants and Re~>pondents. 
-----~ 
BRIEF OW OEFE)[DAXTS AND RESPO)[DENTS 
STATJ:<.;:Jf]~::\T OF FACTS 
Defendani s concur in the statement of fads appear· 
ing in plaintiffs' brief. In their brief defendants will pre-
~ent their argumenh in the fla:tne order as the arguments 
which they refute appear in plaintiffs' brief. 
STA'l'E.\n~NT OF POLNTS RELIED UPON 
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POINT NO. I 
NONUNIFORMITY OF IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN THE 
DISTRICT DO.ES NOT AFFECT THE DETERMINATIOX OF 
TliBJ PROPER PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE TOTAL 
COST OF THE IMPRO"\'R:ifENT. 
POINT NO. II 
ASSESS:'\IENTS OR TAXES FOR DRIVEWAYS AS CON-
TE:I.'IPLATED BY THE PROGRAM DO NOT VIOLATE SEC-
TION 5 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE CTAH CONSTITUTIOK 
OR ANY OTHER PROVISION OF THE STATE OR FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION AS A:-1 ASSESSMENT OR TA.X FOR A 
PRIVATE PURPOSE. 
POINT NO. III 
'I'HE SPECIAL TAX PROVIDED BY SECTION 26 OF 
CHAPTER 7 OF TTTLE 17, UTAH CODE A:-JKOTATED, 1953, 
AS AMENDED, WOULD NOT CAL'SE ANY VIOLA'l'ION OF 
SECTI0:-1 3 OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TI0:-1, WHI-CH PROVIDES FOR AN ELECTION ON THE IN-
CURRING OF INDEBTEDKESS BY CER'I'.'\IN GOVERN-
M8NTAL SUBDIVISIONS. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE BONDS PROVIDED BY CHAP-
TER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS 
AMENDED, DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DEBT LIMITATION 
OF SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE UTAH CONSTI-
TLTION. 
POINT NO. V 
THE FACT 'THAT SECTION 26 OF CHAPTER 7 OF 
TITLE 17, UTAH ·CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, 
SPECIFIES THAT THE TAX TO G"C'ARANTEE PAYMENT 
OF THE BONDS BE LEVIED UPON REAL PROPERTY DOES 
NOT RENDER THE ACT INVALID. 
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POINT NO. VI 
THE SPECIAL TAX PROVIDED RY SECTION 26 OF 
CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AS A:\-IENDED, WOULD NOT BE TO PAY A PRIVATE DEBT 
IX VIOLATION OF ANY SECTION OF THE UTAH CONSTI-
TUTION. 
POINT NO. VII 
THE SPECIAL TAX LEVY TO PAY BONDS WHEN 
NECESSARY TO PREVENT DEFAULT CAN BE MADE 
WITHOUT VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDJlEKT TO TilE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION OR SECTION 7 OF ARTiCLE 1 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
POIKT NO. VJIT 
THE PRIORITY OF ASSESSMENTS PROVIDED BY 
SECTION 17-7-19 UTAH CODI£ ANNOTATED, 1953, AS 
A:.ilENDED, IS NOT INVALID AND DOES NOT INVALI· 
DATE THE ACT. 
POINT NO. IX 
CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, AS AMENDED, IS NOT SO VAGUE AND CNCERTAIN 
AS TO BE INOPERATIVE AND VOID. 
POIKT X 
IN THE EVENT THAT ANY O):[E OR MORE PORTIONS 
OF THE ACT SHOULD BE HELD INVALID THE REThiA!~­
DER SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
ARG1::JILXT 
POINT NO. I 
NONUNIFORliil'l'Y OF IMPROVEJ\IENTS WITHIN" THE 
DISTRICT DOES NOT AFFECT' THE DETERMINATION Q}' 
THE PROPER PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE TOTAL 
COST OF THE IMPROVE;'\IENT. 
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The fact that di!'!'erent p1eces of property are to 
have different improvemeni~ made thereon does not show 
that any property owner muf'l bear more than his proper 
proportionate ~haec of the total co~t of the improvement. 
Plaintifis ::;how no cvidcuce that an) person was in fact 
n~i<l'S~cU more than his proportionate ::;hare J'or the work 
to lJe done on the public Iight of way abutting his prop-
erty. 
AU of tlwse various improvements could have been 
carried on under separate assessment program::;, one pro-
gram for curbs, gutters, sidewalks and driveways, one 
program for curbs, gutters, and driveways, one program 
for curbs, gutters, and sidewalks and another for curbs 
and gutters only. To do RO would result in a great deal 
of duplication of time and effort by engineers and law-
yers, would have required a separate no! ice, hearing, ad-
vertisement for construction bids, eonslruetion contract 
and bond i~r.ue for each pt·og'Yarn. Si.'\'eral ~mall bond 
isr.ue~ would be less easy to ~ell and therefore bear high-
er intere;;t than one bond issue. Thus, the manner in 
\\-hich the ~inglc program i~ being carried out is more 
efficient and economical than a series of separate pro-
grams. Absent a speeific legislative declaration to the 
contrary it sJwuld be a~sumed that the la11- permits the 
count~· to lllflke the improvements in tlte most eHieient 
way practicable. 
Further, the nature of the projeC-t is such that it is in 
fact one program. Sidewalk<; are being built where there 
are no sidewulks and a1·c being omitted "\Yhere sidewalks 
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5 
now exist. A series of separate programs involving curbs 
and gutters would face the pos~ibility that if one or two 
programs were not completed the o:treet ·would be only 
partially curbed and guttered, climinat.ing much of the 
bencnt to the whole district from the curbs and gultero: 
which benefit is largely dependent upon the completion 
of the entire project. If driveways were put in a separatr. 
program it might very well prove necessary, after curbs 
had been put in place and after sidewalks had been laid 
to tear up portions of the curbs and sidewalks, freshly 
conshucted, in order to put in driveways rather than 
proceeding semibly by putting all improvements in at 
the same time with the same labor force pursuant t.o the 
same plans and specifications. 
Finally, at the trlal in the Distriet Conrl the 'vitncss 
Kay (R-88) testified that installation of a driveway from 
gutter to sidewalk "is always considered integral to the 
project that's parl ol' it." The ~arne witness abo testified 
(R-84) that the <'ost to be a~sesscc: again;:1t each particular 
property uwner for c·ttrb, gutter and sidewalk on the south 
side of 48th SottUt was in the same proportion to the total 
rost of curh, gutter and sidewalk on the south side of 48th 
South as the front footage of sueh property owner bears 
to the total front footage on· the South Side oi' 48th South. 
~fr. Kay also testified (R-86) that the same thing woulrl 
he t1ue for the Xorth side of 48th South v.ith respect to 
l'urb, gutter and sidewalk tR-AS). He also testified (R-93) 
that the cost of each driveway to be assessed against a 
particular property owner was in the same proportion 
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6 
to total cost of all driveways as the area of each such 
Jriveway bean; to the total area of all driveways. 
lt i~ re~:;pectfully submitted that the improvements 
contemplated comprise one program or project in fact. 
'l'.hat the effect of the program varies from lot to lot does 
not violate the statutory provision for proportionate 
payments as each property owner must pay hig propor-
tionate share of the cost of the improvement lo hili par-
t ieular property. As plaintiff~ have not assailed the cor-
rcetne~s of the computations attached to the complaint, 
the finding by the Hoard of County Commis:;ioncrs in 
Section ~ of the resolution adopted on April 21 after the 
hearing, that no pic~e of property listed in the a~.oe~s­
ment list will bear more than its proportionate :;hare of 
the cost of the program should not be upset. 
POINT NO. II 
ASSESSMENTS OR TAXES FOR DRIVEWAYS AS CO:-l"· 
TEMPLATED BY THE PROGRAM DO NOT VIOLATE SE'C.. 
TION 5 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
OR ANY OTHER .PROVISION OF 'THE STATE OR FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIO::-r AS A::-r ASSESSC.IENT OR TAX FOR A 
PRIVATE P"C"RPOSE. 
It i~ well e:;tahlished that taws c.an be levied only 
l"or )11Jblic purpOSl'~ but the faet that a public purpose also 
grant~ ("f'rtain :;pl·tial hcT1efit~ to privatP persons, not 
,;hn.l"ed by the community at large, does not destroy the 
publie nature of the purpose insofar fiS the levY and col-
lection of assessments therefor is concerned. The drive· 
ways will not extend beyond the sidevm.lk, but will run 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
only l0 rmn the sjdcwalk to the gutter. ~\11 such driveways 
1dll be built on public property. Admittcdl) these drivc-
lmy,; are of ~pecial benefit to the owner,; of the property 
near whi1~h Jill'_\ arc builL Dnt ihe~e driveways liave 
additional qualitie,; of benefit to the rest of the distrid 
a~ a 11 hole. By fmpervi8ing their com;truction the county 
can make s11rc that l.llP;.· arc ;.,o constructed as to provide 
maximum drainage of the sidewalks, to provide minimum 
wear and tear on the cm·bs and gutter6, and to pl·ovide 
tJw minimum interference in the drainage of the street~ 
h_1· the eolleetion in the gllitcr of dry leavPfl, Proderl r;oil 
and the like. Further, the dl'ivcways penn it ingTI'~6 and 
egrc~s from and to the premises concerned by all the 
public, not just the owners. The inclusion of driveway.-; 
as a statutory purpose amount~ to a legislative l'inding 
that they are a public purpose, and this l'inding should 
not he set aside lightly. 
"'l'he fmmdatiMt ol' the power to lay a ;;perial 
asse;;sment or a special tax for a lor-a! improve-
ment ol' any eharaeter, "' * * is the hcncl'it w11ieli 
the object o[ the a.;sessment or tax con len; on the 
owner of the abutting property, or the owners 
of property in the assesf'ment. or special taxation 
district. which if' different from the general bene-
fit \1-hirh the ow11ers Pnjoy in rommon \Yith the 
other inhabitant~ or ('iti~.rn~ of the municipal cor-
poration." rvr cQuilli11, 111 unicipal CorprJrafions, 3rd 
Ed. val. 1+ P. 1 9-20. 
Be<'au~e there musl be a private hencfi.t conferred 
on t.he abutting property owner to -"ll[iport the theory 
of special assessment, defendants contend that their ad-
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mission that the owners will benefit from the special im-
provement uwlcr· consideration must not be twisted into 
a concession that the driveways are not for a public pur-
pose. 
At the trial it was made manifest that the driveways 
are built upon public property (R-95); that they serve 
the interest~ of pubii(' safet_v and }H~alth; protect the 
public curbs, gutters, roadway6 and sidewalks (R--94-95) 
give the public access to private property (R-108) and 
improve the general appearance of the community (R-
103). It follows, therefore, that the drive11·ay~ ~erve a 
public purpose although resulting in a peculiar benefit 
to the abutting private property. 
PlainriJTf' cite no authority and defendants have been 
able to find none for the proposition that the request and 
1\'aiver signed hy the property owners shonld not be held 
valid and enforceable. A tme copy of the form of waiver 
is attarJwd to del'endant~' answer (H-69). ~\Jthough no 
l~lah rase in point has been found on the subject defenil-
;tr:L; contend that a propert-y owner does have power to 
waive an) right,; he may have to attack a special as~es~­
ment. In C11r'ii11q 1-·. l'wlyfur, 1KI P. Hl, 1:':! Cal.151, U1e 
plaintiff pr'O[JI.'I'ty owner cnt l'red into a 11 ritten agreement 
11·ith tl1e con~truelion rompa11_1 pursunnt to which the 
owner waived 
''any right. ol' prnte~t. ng·nin~t tl1e performance of 
said work IJy the part:· or tl1e seeondpart (defend-
ant \Vor~~~·id;: :-3\reet. PaYing- Co1npan:·) under 
said nmtract (l'or the doinp: of the work) or 
ag-ain~t the assessment created under said resolu-
tion ol' intl•ution No. 105." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
In upbolding the wa1vcr, the California Supreme 
l'ourl said: 
"lt will thu,., be ~Pen that the plainci~'C waived 
every objection which might havR been made, in 
limine, agaim>t t!Je validily of the aRsessrnen( dis" 
trict and the pro<'eedir1p:c; had thereunder saYe and 
except that the method of as~cssing the property 
of the plaintiff wa,; not in aecordan<'c with the 
b f . . d" ene tts recNve . 
Ln Richcreek r. Jif)()rman. 4~ ::-.rortheastern 94:3, 14 
Ind. App. 370, tl.c Appellate l'oud of Indiana upheld a 
waiver executed by a propcrt,\· owner wai.\'inp: all illegali-
tie~ or irregularitier; in the proceedings and assessment 
and signifying his intention to pay such a~sessment in {en 
in~ial!meni~. 'l'llc wrriVI'I' wao: held f'ffedive in the faeP 
ol' ob,icetiom; hy the pr·operty ownN ! hat surh waiver >m~ 
not effective. 
A propeny owner could, if he chose, mortgage hi~ 
Jn·operty to pay the cO<:it of putting a driveway on it. It i:> 
respectf'uJl_,. ,;ubmitted that the agreement to pay the 
amount of the assessment and the agrPement that the re-
(jUest and waiver be binding upon tl1e signer and all sub-
o'f"'luent owners of the property concerned, when properly 
exPcuted, delin,•red and recorded, imposes a lien upon tlw 
property for the proper proportionate share of driveway~ 
as~essed against the property owner even if it should be 
held tlmt. the assessment for driveway purpo~e~ \nts not 
effective. Such a lien was held to have been established 
h~· a property owner when he signed an appropriate 
:~"'sPssment agreement with a membership corporation i11 
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Colonial Financial Corporation v. Nelson, 264 N.Y.S. 139, 
140 ~\Ii~c. 55. Also see 5:3 C.J.S. 835, Liens, Se<.'ti.on 2b. 
In any event plaintiffs should not be permitted to 
~hallenge the validity of an assessment against their 
property which they requested, for a driveway >dli~h they 
requested on the grounds that their property alone will be 
benefitted without benefit to the rest of the district. 
POINT NO. Ill 
THE SPECIAL TAX PROVIDED BY SECTION 26 OF 
CHAPTER 7 OF TfTLE 17, "CTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AS AM1£.t•;Dim, WOULD 1\0T CAUSE ANY VIOLATION OF 
S.I!;CTION 3 OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE L:TAH CONSTITU-
TIO:-:r, WlHCH PROVIDES FOR AN ELECTIO:-r ON TILE IK-
CURRil'>G OF INDEBTEDNESS BY CERTAIN GOVETtK-
_\lEKTAL SUBDIVISIONS. 
As mentioned in paragraph 9 of defendants' answer, 
the election requirement applies by its terms only to "any 
county or subdivision thereof, ... any school district ... 
any city, town or village, or any subdivision thereof in 
ihi~ state .. , None of these terms embraces Salt Lake 
County Spedal ImprovE'.menl Dislrirt l\'umber 1. 
The "Ctah Supreme Court has held on many occasions 
that a district. created to contain part ofthe territory of a 
county in which certain i nl[H"O\"l'llll'nt~ of various natures 
were to be made and financed did not fall 11ithin tl1e pur-
view of either Sectiou 3 or Section± of ~\.rticle H of the 
Constitution. Lehi Cii!J 1 . .lfrifi11g, JS P. 2d 5:30, 81 Utah 
237, held, with re~pect to a metropolitan ·water district 
ereated under what is now Chapter t' of 'l'itle 1:3, as fol-
lows: 
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"\Ve are sati s l'icd that. the metropolitan waLer 
district is not a subdivision of either a city, town 
or county within the meaning o[ ii•c· 11nrd 'sub-
division' a~ used in the Constitution." 
'J'he court then ·went on to hold that the mc•tropolitan 
water district 11·a,; no! ~uhjrc·t io tlw limitations of either 
the election requirement (Hedion 3) or the dchi limit 
{Section 4) IJYovbion~ of !uticlf' 1+ of the Constitution. 
In Pattrrick v. Onrl!on County Water Consr roatire 
lJi.,fricl. HG 1'. 2d. 503, 106 n.ah 55, this eourt held that 
the same constitutional provisions did not appl_v to a 
water conservancy district created under Chaptt>r 9 of 
Tille 73 or· the Utat• Code. 
In Tygesen v. Magna T-Vater Co., 22fi P. 2d. 127, 119 
Utah 274, the Supreme Court held likewise that an im-
provelllent di:'-tl·ict cJ'Cate:J under Chapter G of Title lJ 
of the Uah Code is nol subjc<:t to these constitutional 
limitation~ by the IPTillfi ol' tho~c· lin1itations. 
ll should be noted that in the law~ creating carh of' 
t:ll' three t:pr·~ or d;~l.ri:·l~ t;:(•n(ioned above tlte l~·gisla­
ture did provide that an election must be held for tht> 
creation o!' lndeht('d"-"~" and is>-uanee of bonU6. In ~o 
providing the legi~latnre exercised scrupulous regard (r, 
make sure thai indt>btedne~s ,\-as not imposed upon the 
taxpayers of an area '1·ithout. their assent. at the polls, 
even thm1gh no such assL'ilt was required ln· tlte Constitu-
tion. In the creation of special improvement districts 
under Chapter 7 of Title 17 the legislature evidently did 
not feel thai even those prineiple8, stricter than the con-
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stitutional requirements, which made it apply the election 
requirements to the aforementioned districts would re-
quire the holding of an election in districts organi~ed 
under said Chapter 7 for the issuance of special as$cs~­
ment bond~ which would he payable from taxes only in 
even! of a default in the collection of the assessments. 
In contending that the county, by the creation of 
this district and the ismance of bonds payable in the 
manner specified, amount;; to the incurring of indebted-
ness by the county by rircumvention, plaintiffs disregard 
the l'aet that it is not the county that pays the bonds. 
'!'he bowh are to be paid only by the o·wners of property 
in the distrid. and no obligation is imposed upon the 
county as a whole. Plaintiffs :>trorJgest authority seem;; 
to be the dissenting opinion in Barlow v. Clearfidd City 
Corpo-ration, 268 P. 2d. 682,1 "C"tah 2nd 419. This dissent, 
points out well and strongly the facl that under the 
majority opinion the Legislature can provide for the 
creation of districts to finance projects which counties 
themselves, or cities, cannot finance. It is respedfully 
submitted that if plaintiffs consider this an evil, their 
remedy i~ to persuade the Legislature to repeal the la"-" 
permitting the creation of o:uch distril'!o:, fo persuade 
the county ofl'i('iaJs not to create sueh districts under the 
lawH 11·hidt the Legislature passes or to attempt to amend 
the Comtitution. 
But even if it should be conceded that the provisions 
of Scct.ion 3 of Article XIV apply to the distrid. the type 
of securit~· proposed to be issued i;; not deUt within the 
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meaning of said section. There J~ no obligation on !lw 
part of the eounty to levy taxes in the di::;tr.ict until and 
unless a default occurs in the payme11t of special assess-
ments. Even then, the tax v,"'ill bt> levied only if it appears 
that the amount of special assessments required to assure 
prompt payment of princi1lal and in tcr·c~l falling due ·will 
not be collected in time. In short, there is no obligation 
at present and there will be no obligation upon the issu-
ance of the bond~ for t.he c·ount~ to levy any taxes. If 
it is neces;;ary to lev:· taxes in any year for such purpose 
the tuxef' so levied in the then current year ·will be suf-
ficient to extingni"h the obligation accruing in that year. 
ScJ, even if th0 ohli,'-t:tlinn tn lr·\·y taxr•"' were debt, i1 
would not he dehj "in r:;rc·fS of ta:..cs for tfte {'urrent 
year,'" which requires an election llllder the Constitution. 
TJickinsfJJ/ i'. S',r/1 ],akc Ci11j, 19:·J I'. 1110, 57 L'tah 530. 
In any cv0nt, tJJP (jUestion of whether a promise to 
lev:· taxP~ for the payment of special asse~sment bondi:l 
in ca~e ol' a default ol' special assesRments <:onstitute~ 
debt under Hections 3 and 4 of Article XlY of the COJl-
~titution has already been anRwered by this eourt in 
Wicks rs. 8at Lake City, 208 P. 538, 60 rtah 2f-i5. There, 
under a (JUoted law, Salt Luke· City contemplated levying 
a one mill tax throughout the r:it:> to raise l'unds for a 
special improvement guaranty fund to pay maturing 
special assessment bonds of a small lighting distriet with-
in the eity upon the contingency that the assessments 
collected be insufl'icicnt. 
The plaintiff in the \Vicks case contended that the 
.-tatute authorizing the raising of money by taxation to 
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viRions of Sections :1 and -l of Artiele XlV of the Utah 
Con:>titution. In upholding the law the Court said: 
"It mur;t he cunccded that these provi:>ions, 
like every other provir;ion of the CoiiStitution, are 
the paramount law of the :>tate concerning the 
sub,jcds to which they relate. Any law enacted by 
the Legislative in conflict therev.ith is null and 
void, but the conflict must first be made to ap" 
pear. If t.here i~ allY reasonable doubt about it, 
the law will not be declared unconstitutional. Thi~ 
i.~ elementary doctrine ... To hold that a solelllll 
ad of t}w Legislature intended to mpport and 
mair1tain tlw eredit of the municipalities of t"he 
state i8 urJc•on~titutional on ~0111e vague theory 
that in its operation there is the bare~t possibility 
of a continl.\·c-nc-y arising in 11 hich there may be an 
in l'ringemer1t of the Const itntion i~ going further 
than an.1 (·ase which has heretofore come under 
my observation.'' 
It should l1e noted, by the 11·ay, that in Wicks v. Salt 
Lake Cily the tax wa~ levied througlwul 11w rit;;- rather 
than in ,jmt the area in which the special assessmei1ls 
were le>ied. 
It is :respedfully ~uhmitt.Pd, therefore-, t1mt the elec-
tion requirl'llll'll\. of brl't ion 3 of .\rt iele .\:I\- of the Utah 
Con;;titution doe;; not apply because t,a) Salt Lake 
County Special Improvement IJist riet ~umber One is not 
one of the entitie;; l'owreJ by that section and (b) the 
obligations to he issued do not constitute debt within the 
meaning of that section. 
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POINT NO. IV 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE BONDS PROVIDED BY CHAP-
TER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 195::1, AS 
A}IE~DED, DOES :'rOT VIOLATE THE DEB'T Lll\IITATIO~ 
OF SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE LTAH CONSTI-
TUTION. 
For the rea~ons ~et out in Point IH above the pro-
vi~iorw of Article Xl'C, 8edion -±, ol' the l'tah Con6titu-
tion do nut apply to di.;;trictr-: of this ~ort or to lJoJld~ of 
the type issued under Chapter I or 'l'ille 17 of the rtuh 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. It ~ltould be not.Pd 
that the d0bt limit. section or Article.XIV of the t:on-
stitution (Section±) doe,; not afl'cct even as nmny gov-
ernmental unitr; ar; the r.lection refjnirement ~:;ection (Sec-
tion 3). Subdivi~ions or <:OUTitil'~. although mentiom~d in 
Section 3 are not mentioned in Section 4. 
Further, as meniinnrd above, the obligation LS pri-
marily lu pay the bonds l'rom the pwceeds ul' the c·oller-
tion o-f the special assessments. TF·ic::ks v. i·}a./t Lake City, 
.)'uvu. In that case, mentiom~d in Point III above, illP 
court dedared at page 541: 
"PlaintilJ dues not eontenU that it manifestly 
appear::; that the Act of 1921 att('lllpt::; to authorize 
the creation of an indebtedne::;s in excess of the 
limit fixed by the Constitution, but the contention 
seems to be that there i~ a vague and remote po~~i­
hility that a literal compliance with the law may al 
some time in the future result in the creation of 
an indPhtednes9 in excess of the com;tih1iional 
limit. \Ve seriously doubt if there is a sufficient 
showing on the part of the plaintiff cmtcerning 
this question to justify an extended discussion." 
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Plaintiffs' contention that the law is unconstitutional 
for failing to provide a method to determimo the applica-
tion of the county debt limit to the diJ5trid renders the 
act invalid iJ5 erroneous for the two reasons mentioned 
above. If, however, the county debt limit did apply, it 
would not be for the Legislature, by its ovm aet, to defilw 
the area of ih application. This is a judicial function. 
POINT NO. V 
THE FACT THAT SECTION 26 OF CHAPTER 7 OF 
TITLE 17, UTAH 'CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS A}lENDED. 
SPECIFIES THAT THE TAX TO GCARANTEE PAY.\iEl\T 
OF THE BONDS BE LEVIED UPON REAL PROPERTY DOES 
NOT RENDER THE ACT INVALID. 
'!'he fir~t (·a~c relied upon by the plaintiffs in tho 
corresponding part of tlH_.;r brid, CoHiiiifJ,!al Xafional 
Bank of Sttlt Lake City v. Naylor, 179 P. 67, 54 rtah --1-!l 
conc•erned a bank ~uin{( to enjoin the collection of prOJJ· 
erty taxes levied agaimt it~ capital stock in the hand~ 
of it~ ~tockholder~. Thf' plaintiff bank alleged that the 
Couuty Assessor had, in a~sc~sing the bank ~tork, dis-
criminated against hank stock as a claf'.~ of property and 
as~f's~ed it at a higher proportion of its yalue than other 
types of property. The court found and held that al-
though apparentl: some such di,.;c-riminatlon did exi::t, 
the1·c wa~ no suh~lnntial evidence of intention or design 
on the part of the as><e~sor or Board of Equalization to 
discriminate against the plaintiff bank and other bank~ 
or stoekholders by the adoption of wrong principals, 
~>tandards or methods or in any other respect. Therefore, 
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the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court deny-
ing the application for a perpetual injunction. It ::;hould 
lw particularly noted that lhis case did not. involve an 
attempt h_;· the Legislature hy general law to dassify 
property for taxation according to the purp<bP of the 
tax. Any di~crin1ination in taxation or a~::;c::;snwnts in 
the situation involved in that mse was due to the County 
A~~l'i:!SOr, in violation of ratl1c1· than in compliance ·with 
statute. 
The other case relied upon by plaintiffs to support 
the contention of Point V of their brief is Kerr v. 1-t'ool-
!ty, 2-± P. 831, 3 Utah 456. There was no question in this 
case of either as:>cssi11g or taxing different property at 
different rates. The question was purely one of what 
safeguards had to be in a t&-..::ing ::;tatute, and the coul'l. 
held that the r;tatute involved was void because it pro-
vided for U"te crPation of o:rhool distrirtr; which would tax 
at a rate determined by vote of t.h.e electors ·without re-
gard to the need~ of the district, that there was no re-
quirement of an oath or fidelity bond on behalf of the 
trustees and no appeal was allowed the taxpayers for 
tl1e equalization of fl~S<'P.Sm<'nts. 
In providing ror the taxation of real property only, 
m Section 17-7-26 the Legi~lalnre did Irnt pr·ovide fnr 
any discrimination in amounts of assessed valnations or 
in ratf's of leV}'. The taxation on real property will in 
all event::; comply strictly with Lloc provisions of Sections 
2 and 3 of Article XIII. The only (1ue~tion as to uni-
fonnity arises from the fact that ol' all tangible property 
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m the disJ.rid only real property will be taxed. The 
que~tion the1r i.s •dtether the legi::!lature can so classify 
propert.1 l'or taxation without violating the aforemen-
tioned con~lituhonal prohibitions. 
For otdinary governmental purposes it would be 
doubtful that the legislature could comtitutionall.1· so 
das~ify pr·operty that one type of property bore rnore 
than it~ proportionate share of the cost of operating the 
govcmment than another type of property. However, in 
the particular statute involved the taxation is not for the 
purpose of the ordinary experu;es of running the govern-
ment. The taxation iR only for the rmrpose of payi11g 
part of the cost of certain local improvements to real 
property. Tlw taxes arP to be levied only to cover a 
failun: of thP ownero: of real property in the district to 
pay thP bond;; through the medium of o:pecial asse~;;;­
ments. 11 has long been recognized that the uniformity 
requirements of tlw o:tatr constitution do not prohibit the 
levy ol' ;;per,ial asse;;~uwnto: against real property only, 
11he11 the purpo;;e of tlw lr\;;· is for a local improvement 
or nature here rontemplaif'd. lf the la\1 provided that 
all propt>rl ;.·, real:md personal, he taxed to mert a default 
in ~pPtial n.;;;~p~~nwnt~ thf· pffeel would he to throw upon 
I he prrsonal vropert;. ta"pa;. ers a burden which was to 
be l1orne 1Jy tl1c re;1l proper!._Y tnxpnyens alone. 
In Lundber:1 Y~. (hen! Ril'fl·lrrigatiou DL,·trid, 119 
P. 103il, 40 Utah :<3. the Supreme Court of rtah upheld 
an act providing for the Jey;..- of a;.:sPilsments. on land in 
an ir1·ip1lion di~t1·iet nt the rate of $7.50 per acre in 
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spite of the plaint.iff's contention that since ::~ome land 
in the district waR worth more per acre than other land 
~nrh an a~sesslllcnl Yiolated the constitutional require-
ment that property be taxed uniFormly according to its 
value. 'l'hc court held: 
·'The answer to this contention ifl that, in 
adopting lhc com;titutional provision referred to, 
it was not intended that it should apply to ;;pecial 
t 
" 
assessmen fl. 
Delendanl;.; urge that the mere name "·lrich is given 
to a govcnunenlal charge ~honld not alone determine 
whether that charge i~ eonst.ilutional or not. If a <'harge 
i~ in fad a special asse~sment it should be tr·catcd as 
such although labeled a tax or, if it is in effeet a tax 
though (·filled a etpc~cial asscs::;lrlcnt it shollid be treated 
as a Ia\. II', H~ hc're, the charge partak(·~ part!;' of the 
nature of a special assessment and partly of the nature 
of a tax it r;honld he t.realed accordingly. 
It i~ not jmt the name ··special assesr;ment"' that 
exempts certain charges from the uniformity require-
ment, but the nature of those charg·c~ which are levied 
for certain types of improvements which enhance the 
value or· otherwise peculiarly improve real propert .. '· in 
a certain ~pecific territory. Special assf'R~men(s are an 
exception to the ;::·encral r·u18 that all persons pay taxPs 
according to some uniform measure of tllCir ability rather 
than according to the benefit derived from the use to 
which thP taxes are put. 
Defendants maintain that when ad valorem t.axes 
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are- levied for a purpose which will benefit only tl1e real 
estate in a particular district the personal property may 
constitutionally be relieved of the burden of such taxa-
tion. In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroa-d Co. Y. 
Cenfral Weber Sewer Improvement Didri!ct, 287 Pacifie 
2d. 884, 4 l 1tah 2nd 105, plaintiff utility and railroad 
companies obtained district court judgment whirlt e~­
cluded certain real and personal property from a dislrid 
organized under 'Chapter 6 of Title 17 of the Lltall'Cod~ 
Annotated 195:\ -.,vith power to levy ad valorem taxe~. 
The solp reason for excluding the property from the 
distrin was that it would not be benefited by the sewer-
age to he accompli~hed in the distrirt and therefore 
should not be taxed. It appears that considerable real and 
personal property of the plaintiffs was ·within the bound-
arie~ of the district. as originally created by the Boartl 
of County Comisr;ionerr; of Weber County. In affinninp: 
the decree of tlw trial court the Rupreme Court of Ftah 
held "that ihc legislature h~d in mind burdening all 
taxable vroperty in the district, if necessary, real or 
personal, with the cost of the project, unlP~s it is sltown 
by protest timely registered, or by review timely takf'n 
that sndt real or personal property would not be beM-
I"iled directly by the improvemenh, in which event ~nrh 
propf'rty ~hould he ext'luded from the dio;trid and remain 
nontaxahlP." In .~o holding, defendanto; eontcnd, the Su-
preJne Court of l:tah rPcognized that tlt(' Legislature ran 
eon~titntionall,,- fll!tlHlt'i7.C an ad valorem tax on property 
of a benefited rlfl~~ while not k\'ied on propPrt~- of a 
non-bctwfited rla~~ in the ~ame geograpltie arca. AI-
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though in the De11ver & Rio Grande <:aRe the non-bene-
fited property ·was excluded from the dio;trict, this 
exclusion was based only on the fact that it should not 
be ta..;ed as the property wa.s in the territory surrounded 
by the district's boundaries. The same effect is achieved 
by the Legislature in Chapter 7 of Title 17 Ly provirling 
that only the benefited vroperty (that is the real prop-
erty) be taxed to pay prineipal and interest on the bonds 
in rase the as~t6~rnents levied against ~w:fl properlr 
prove insnffieiPnt. Therefore defendantfl believe that this 
{·ourt has in eirect already declared that lherc ean con-
:;titutionally be a tax -.,vhich, like the one under di8CU66iou, 
partakes so much of the nature of a governmental charge 
for an improvement peculiar to certain real pt·opedy 
that it eomes >I ilhin the exeeption to the unifonnity rule 
in 8r(·tion~ :! and 3 of Article XIII of the Utah Co;tsti-
tution a;; that exception hac; been deFined by thi~ court. 
Oelcndants further urge Jhat the tax provided by Section 
17-7-JG, U.C.A., is ;.;ueh a tax. Also see .')'tate v. Cnrin!le 
lJrai·nage District. lGG Par.ific 921, -tS l'tah 1, in which 
t]te Ctah Supreme Court upheld a drainage distri<>t act 
againo:t objections brought under the afor<>mentioned 
uniformity provisions of the Constitution. 'l'he plaintiff 
had alleged the act was invalid becaur;e it provided for 
the taxation of lands "\\'i.thin a drainage district exclusive 
of improvements thereon. ~'he oourt held that the a<>rcage 
taxes \I"L·rt> special n.s;.;essmcnts and therefore the uni-
formity rule did not apply. 
McQuillin Sttpra, vol. 1-1, p. 27 states a.Jl follows: 
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"The late cases support the general propo-
sition, ~ctt.lcd hy carliN decisions, that: t.he con-
stitutional re11uirement. of equality and 1miformity 
of taxalion has no application to asse~smcnts or 
special taxation for local improvementf'. ln other 
words, C'harges for the costs of a local improve" 
ment. against the property benefited by ibc im-
provement, although an exercise of the ta:xing 
power, are not such taxes as are referred to in 
the various clauses of the comtitution and ihry 
are neither embraced, nor intended to be embrtu'ed 
in them.'' 
POINT NO. VI 
THE SPECIAL TAX PROVIDED BY SECTION 26 OF 
CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AS AMEKDED, WOULD NOT BE TO PAY A PRIVATE DEBT 
IN VIOLATIOK OF ANY SECTION OF THE UTAH CO::\STI-
TUTION. 
The paynwnt ol' the bonds i'rom taxe~ would not 
relieve an.\ defaulting proper·t.1· 011ner of his liability 
to pay the a~se~sments levied against his property. Tlrcsr 
taxe,; would be levied under Section 1 j" -I -:lfi. The law 
provides that the proceeds of Uw tn),. be deposited in a 
special improvement gnaran!.1 :·und applicable only to 
the bonds of the dislr·ic-t and be' used solely for tlw pur-
po~e of paying prineipal of and interest on those bonds 
a;; to "hir'h there would otherwise be default. 8cdinn 
1"7-7-25 cnutcrnplah'~ that all money received from the 
assl'~~nrr.'Trt~ when finally paid, or from the ~ale of land 
to pay for such assessments, be held by the County 
Treasurer and used solely to pay principal and interest 
on the bond:;;, after the r'ost of the improvement ha~ been 
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paid for. If a property owner defaults in payrng his 
special assessment and the ddault continues so long that 
it is necesmry to levy the spee.ial tax, then, when the 
defaulting property owner pay.~ hi::! assc~smcnt. or when 
his property is sold, the proceeds of such pay"'Tilent or 8ale 
on foreclosure would remain in the hands of the County 
Treasurer and could be used only for paying the bond8. 
When the bonds are finally paid, any money which re-
mains in t.he hands of the County Treasurer should be 
treated as money in the special improvement guaranty 
fund to he rebated to the then owners of the real property 
in the distriet in the same proporti-ons as tJw aggregate 
amount of tlw taxes previously paid by the then and 
former ov.'llers of ear.h ~UI'h piece of real property beaTs 
to the total taxi.'» paid by the owners of all real pt·o}Jerty 
in such dislriet during the life of the bonds. Thus, it is 
~een !hat the taxpayers would not he required to pay any-
one's private debts. They would be required to pay under 
eertaiu circumstances principal of and interest on bonds 
><liich could haY!' bcc·n r.1wJe pu;·able from taxf'fl on their 
property 1\ilhout the use of special a~ser;sment:; at all. 
The case of Nelson vo;. Board of ClimmL~s-1:oners IJl 
Davis County, :!l.S P. 952, 62 rtah :.n 8, relied upon by 
the plaintiffs was not decided on the ground that one 
taxpayer should not be compelled to pay the defaultiJlg 
assessments of another. Indeed, the ca~e held lhe exact 
opposite and specil'ieflll_v pcnnii~cd as~e~sments, up to 
an increase of 15~{-, to be levied lor just such purposes. 
The holding of the Ntlson ease was that since the statnt1.~ 
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prohibited further levies they could not be made. Addi-
tionally, the court held that all charges levied hy the irri-
gation district were special .assessments and not general 
taxes. The quoted language appearing in plaintiff's brief 
supports that conclusion, ·whe1·e it says I hat "a landovt'lleJ' 
cannot m1d should not be penalized further than is pro-
1'ided ht the act for h-is pro-rata sharP of rfelinquencirs 
of other p1·operty o-wners in failing to pay the tax against 
their property." 
Defendants submit that the comtitutional power of 
the Legislature to provide for a special assessment guaJ·-
anty fund payable from taxes has already been settled 
by thi~ court in lVichs v. Salt Lake City, cited above. 
POINT NO. VII 
THE SPECIAL TAX LEVY TO PAY BONDS WHE)I 
NECESSARY TO PREVENT DEFAULT CAN BE MADE 
WTTHOU'J' VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 
'THE FOURTEENTH AliiENDr.IENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTIO~ OR SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE 1 OF 
TIIE UTAH CO:-l"STITUTIOX 
Find, it r;honld he noied that tl1c'~l' ta:-..0~ art' to be 
levied no[ arrording to the llenef'it dcriYed Uy earh pierl' 
of' proper(_\, 'l'h1·.1· are to be levied on an ad valorew 
hn~is, and tflv'~ so le1·ied do not require a hearing on 
benefit:-. KP!Iff v. T'ilto·l!argli. 10-! r.s. IS, ~tl Law~·f'n 
Edition C.JS. Jforton Salt Co. v. rity of South H1dthi11-
so11, 1/'i Fed. 2d. 889. Plaintiffs' brief <.'Olltend~ that the 
tax •·j, either a r;pecial tax or an n~~c-~~~~~ent. a:nd the 
defendanto: should not he allo,\·ed to treat it as an ao-
~I'S:<ment. io p:Pt around the I'On~titutional limitation:; 
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which would apply if it were a tax and then turn around 
and treat it as a tax .in order to get around the consti-
tutional limitations ·which ·would apply if it i:; an assess-
ment." This is rather Like saying that a mule must be 
either a horse or a donkey. As prc\'iously mentioned in 
this b1·id', the t.a.x partake~ of the naturE' of a ~1weial 
assessment to the L'l..l(•nl that it. is lPvied only against 
the class of property benefited but partakes of the nature 
ol' a genPral tax to the extent that upon the dass of prop-
erty lwnerited it acts on an ad valorem basi;; rather than 
a benefit lJasi~. For this reason the tax is not. a J'C-
asscssment. 
In the Improvement Di~trict Law (Chaptc•r 6 ol' 'ritlc 
11 of the nah Code El53) upheld m Denrn· & Ilio 
Grande Western Railroad Cornpany v. Central TVdnr 
Seu:er Improvement Disft·ici_. cited above, the only hear-
ing required \vas the initial hearing to determine whether 
the property to hf' included in the diiitriet would be bene-
fited by the irnprovements to be made. i-'r·uperty o-wners 
were not permitted to show that their prorrerty would be 
benefited in an amount less than tlte amount of ad val-
orem taxes to be levied on their property because, as 
mentioned above, no hearing is required prior to the Jc-vy 
of taxes on an ad valorem ba.sis. In thal case the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the tax on benefited pt"operty 
wa~ valid even Jhough certain other property in the Jcr-
ritoriallimits of' the district. was excluded from the dis-
trict and taxation thereby for Jack or benefit. 
However, even if it should be held that the taxi~ a 
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form of as&essrnent or reassessment to the extent that it 
requires a hearing, the pruvision for the tax was in tlw 
law at the time of the hearing in April 1958, and all 
property ownerc; were presumed to know that law. 'rhe 
fact thai they did not rai~e any question then preclude~ 
any further action or requirement of hearing. 
It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Uta], 
in Wicks v. Salt Lake City, cited above, upheld the tax 
to guarantee special assessment bonds without even 
que~tioning whether a new ru:;sessment was involved. 
'l'hc authoritie;; cited by plailltiff;; support only tbe 
proposition that in order to lRvy special as;:.essln(•nt:.: 
aceording lo benefits a hf'aring m\Jst be held. With thio 
contention \\C agree. ln all of the cited cases, Lhe amount 
of the rharge which hpcame a lien upon the property wa~ 
detPrmined not on an ad valorem basis, as here, h11t by 
the amount of hPnPfit or service receivpd hy the property. 
POINT NO. VIII 
THE PRIORITY OF ASS~SSMENTS PROVIDED BY 
SUCTIO;;..:r 17-7-19 UTAH CODL ANNOTATED. 1953, AS 
A!I-IEKDED, IS NOT INVALID A~D DOES NOT INVALI· 
DA'I'F: THE AC'I'. 
Apparently plaintiffs feel that the assessment~ to 
be levied under Section 17-1-19, t'.C.A., 1953, can not 
have tile parity of lien mentioned in that section. Plain-
tit"!~ have failed to citP and defendants can not find any 
eonstitutionnl pro,·ision which would be violated by the 
assessment o;' canying thP same priority of lien as general 
taxP~, and in tlw ah~ence ol such a constitutional pro-
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vision, the legislative ad must be allowed to stand. 
The fact that it may conflict. with other previously 
enaded statutes does not, of course, make the aforemen-
tioned Section 19 invalid. The ca,;es cited by plaintiffs 
J.ealt with situation~ -..,vhere the priuril) of lien was not 
spetil'ied by statute. In thic; case the most recently en-
.c:.,·ted statute, which is the aforementioned Chapter I 
prevailf'. Rection 19 of that chapter provides that special 
assE'f'f'mE'nts rank on equalily with general taxes, and, 
as mentioned in defendants' Answer, the assessments arc 
to rank on an equality with taxes levied againf't the 
property involved for the same year or years in which 
the installments fall due. 
In any event the severability clau::~e in Sedion 19 of 
Chapter :12 of the Laws of 1957, which appears irnrnedi-
atd~· after Seetion17-7-28, l~.C.A. would require a sever-
ance of the priority of lien provision if it ~hould he found 
invalid, without affecting the rest of the act. '!'hi::; sever-
abiliJy clause reads as follows: 
"If any one or more provunons of this act 
or lhe application thereof to any person or cir-
cumst.ance :;;hall ever be held by an)· court to be 
invalid the remaining provio;ions hereof and their 
application to persons or circumstance other than 
those to wJ1ich they have lJeen held to be invalid 
shall not be affected thereby." 
So if it should be held that the Section 19 of Chapter 9 
is invalid, ~uch invalidity ·would not an'ect the rest ol' the 
act and there is pending no question as to the pl'iority 
of any lien:;; at the present time. 
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POINT NO. IX 
CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, AS AMENDED, IS NOT SO VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN 
AS TO BE INOPERATIVE AND VOID. 
A:-; specified in defendants· Answer, the chapter i~ 
not void for vagueness. The bonds will he tho~e of the 
Board of County Commissioners issued on behalf of the 
district by said Board in its capacity as governing au-
thority of the district. 'I' he Jaw shows quite clearly upon 
what propert;, and whom the assessments and taxes are 
to be levied, and by what body they arc to Ue levied. 
Plaintiffs cite no question of :-;ubstanec, whieh will affect 
the rights of any person, whi(']J j:-; not answered wifh 
adPquate clarity br tlw tennc: of tl1c aet. 
While it is true that when a statute i~ so vague and 
nncPrt.ain as to hP unenforceable the court will not en-
fore,; it, this statute iF sufficiently clear, the right~ of 
all parties are ndeqnf!.tPly "lweified and there i~ no 
quc~tion but 11·hat ii can be enforced. 
50 _Anl. Jur. --l-S6 cited by plaintiffs in their brief 
sets dmrn a rule for measuring whether a statn(P i.< 
constitutional wit.h which we heartily agree. It i~ a~ fol-
lowr;: 
"In determining whether a ~tntute is void for 
unePrtaintr, thP :::tatutt> should be considered as a 
whole." 
In appl~-illg" thi~ l"nle to Chapter I we are convinced 
thai the law ~tands thl' te~l. Fai1·l~ and reasonably con-
~idNed, the statutf\ it i~ submitted, i~ not so vague and 
unceetuiu n~ to he inoperativE' and void. 
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POINT X 
IN THE EVENT THAT ANY ONE OR MORE PORTIONS 
OF THE ACT SHOULD BE HELD INVALID THE REMAIN-
DER SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
In Point VIII above, defendants ~et out the severa-
bility clause appearing in Section 19 of the act. The rule 
adoptf'd by tile Utatt Supreme ·Court i~ that if a statute 
is in part constitutional and in part illlconstitutional the 
unconstitutional parts alone will be stricken unle~s, by 
~tdking them, it wtdU be ilrlpo~;.;ible to give cfl'0d to 
the apparent intent of the Legislature. Stillman v. Ly:nch, 
192 P. 272, 56 Utah 540. In that case the <'onrt upheld 
the general taxing laws of Utah while striking a pro-
vision for an unconstitutional deduction from asr;essed 
valuation of bank stocks. 
It i~ respectfully mhmitted that if, under Point H 
of Plaintiffr;' and dei'Pndanis' b1·iel'~ the court ~hould 
detennine that driveways are for a private purpose 
purely find not sufficiently a pnblic pnrpMe to suppor't 
the levy of special asser;pnwntR, the eourt should hold void 
only ~o much of the r,tatule and .,;hould enjoin only ;;o 
mn('h of the proceedings as relates to driveways. 
If 1mdcr Point IH the court should hold that the 
levy of taxes to pay the bonds in ('ase of default of 
special assesRmen(,.; ('(_lll~l.itutr.;~ debt. in exces~ of taxes for 
the current year in violation or Sedion 3 ol' Article XIV 
of the Constitution, unless an election iR held, defendanh: 
pray the court to enter a decree holding that before any 
such taxes can be levied or bonds is.,;ued pledging the 
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taxing power to the ext.cnl specified, an election must 
be- held in the district under the provisions of law re-
lating to the indebtedness of counties, and such election 
mu;;f cany. 
If Fnder Point IV the court should determine that 
the bonds ~ecured by the levy of taxes when nece~~an 
to prevent default violates the debt limit provi~ion of 
Section 4 of Article XIV of the U.ah Con~tiiution, de-
fendant<; pray the court in its deerPP lo ~pecify how the 
limitation is to be applied and should o;pecify that bond8 
not be i~~ued in exce~"' or that limit. 
I r UTldcr Points 'i-, YI or \'II the court .~l1ould de-
termine that the special tax for payment of bonds whicl1 
would otherwise default cannot be levied at all 1rithom 
violating the Comtitution of the State of Utah, defend-
ants pray thP court to Pnter a decree holding valid all of 
the act except for 8cetion2G of Chapter 7, as that ~edion 
alone, 'drich providP.'i for the levy of such !av'~, can be 
held void without affecting the remainder of the act. Tn 
case such a dce1·ee should enter it should specify that 
the bond~ be payable from the levy of special as~e~~­
ments. 
If under _Point Y the rourt ~hould find that the tax 
violate~ the uniformil) proYisinn~ of the rtah Constitu-
tion in Section>< :l nnd 3 or· Article XIII hy the levy of 
tnx1·~ upon real prnpL•rt~- only, the defendam~ pray th~ 
court to hold that the tuxP~ must be lrYied on all taxable 
property in the district. 
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CONCLUSIO);f 
Defendants submit that for the reasons set forth in 
Point.s I through IX above, Chapter 7, 'l'it.lc 17, L'tah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amende:J, is constitutional and 
valid and that the decree of the DiRtrkt ·Court should"be 
affirmed and defendanl_.s should be allowed their costs 
herein. 
In the event, however, that the Court holds any one 
or more portions of Chapter 7 invalid the remainder 
should be upheld as o:et forth in "Point X above. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM 'I'. 'I'Hl~R~\IAN 
Attorney .for Defendants and 
Respondn~ts 
720 )J"ewhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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